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An extended social choice framework is proposed for the analysis of initial
conferment of individual rights. It captures the intuitive conception of decision-
making procedure as a carrier of intrinsic value along with the instrumental
usefulness thereof in realizing valuable culmination outcomes. Our model of
social decision-making consists of two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, the society
decides on the game form rights-system to be promulgated. In the second
stage, the promulgated game form rights-system, coupled with the revealed
proﬁle of individual preference orderings over the set of culmination outcomes,
determines a fully-ﬂedged game, the play of which determines a culmination
outcome at the Nash equilibrium. A set of suﬃcient conditions for the existence
of a democratic social choice procedure, which chooses a game form in the ﬁrst
stage that is not only liberal, eﬃcient and Nash solvable, but also uniformly
workable for every revealed proﬁle of individual preference orderings over the
set of culmination outcomes, is identiﬁed.
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11. Introduction
1.1. Historical Background
Ever since Sen (1970, Chapter 6 & Chapter 6*; 1970a; 1976) acutely crystal-
lized the logical conﬂict between the welfaristic outcome morality in the weak
form of the Pareto principle and the non-welfaristic claim of libertarian rights
into the impossibility of a Paretian liberal, a huge literature has evolved along
several distinct avenues.1 In the ﬁrst place, some of the early literature either
repudiated the importance of Sen’s impossibility theorem, or tried to ﬁnd an
escape route from the logical impasse identiﬁed by Sen. In the second place,
capitalizing on the seminal observation by Nozick (1974, pp.164-166), alterna-
tive articulations of libertarian rights, which are game-theoretic in nature, were
proposed by G¨ ardenfors (1981), Sugden (1985), Gaertner, Pattanaik and Suzu-
mura (1992), Deb (1990/2004; 1994), Hammond (1995; 1996) and Peleg (1998).
Recollect that Sen’s original articulation of libertarian rights was in terms of
the preference-contingent constraints on social choice rules by means of indi-
vidual decisiveness. In contrast, these game-theoretic articulations captured
the essence of libertarian rights by means of individual freedom of choosing
admissible strategies in the game-theoretic situations where individual liberties
a r ea ts t a k e .U n l i k et h eﬁrst class of work, these alternative articulations were
meant to provide more legitimate methods of capturing the essence of what lib-
ertarian rights should mean.2 In the third place, the crucial problem of initial
1Some of these literature are succinctly surveyed and evaluated by Suzumura (1996;
2007). See also Sen (2002, Part VI) for his recent evaluation of the issues of liberty and
social choice.
2Note that these alternative articulations of libertarian rights do not claim to resolve
the impossibility of a Paretian liberal. Quite to the contrary, Pattanaik (1996) and Deb,
2conferment of libertarian rights was occasionally mentioned in the literature
without providing a fully-ﬂedged analytical framework.3 Suﬃce it to cite just
one salient example. In his rebuttal to the game form articulation proposed
by Gaertner, Pattanaik and Suzumura (1992), Sen (1992, p.155) concluded
as follows: “Gaertner et al. (1992) do, in fact, pose the question, ‘How does
the society decide which strategies should or should not be admissible for a
speciﬁc player in a given context?’ This, as they rightly note, is ‘an important
question’. ... [I]t is precisely on the answer to this further question that the re-
lationship between the game-form formulations and social-choice formulations
depend ... . We must not be too impressed by the ‘form’ of the ‘game forms’.
We have to examine its contents and its rationale. The correspondence with
social-choice formulations becomes transparent precisely there.” The purpose
of this paper is to contribute to this less cultivated issue within the theory of
libertarian rights.
1.2. Basic Problem
Pattanaik and Razzolini (1997) showed that there are several natural variants of the impos-
sibility of a Paretian liberal even when libertarian rights are articulated in terms of game
forms.
3Pattanaik and Suzumura (1994; 1996) and Suzumura (1996; 2007) identiﬁed three dis-
tinct issues in the analysis of libertarian rights. The ﬁrst issue is the formal structure of
rights. The second issue is the realization of conferred rights. The third issue is the initial
conferment of rights. In Sen’s theory of libertarian rights, the formal structure of rights was
articulated in terms of the preference-contingent constraints on social choice rules, whereas
the issue of the realization of conferred rights could be boiled down to the existence of
a social choice rule which respects the preference-contingent constraints on social choice
rules. However, Sen has never addressed himself to the issue of initial conferment of rights.
This is presumably because his interest was focussed squarely on the conﬂict between the
non-welfaristic claim of libertarian rights and the welfaristic claim of the Pareto principle.
3To illustrate the nature of the problem of initial conferment of game form
rights, consider the following example.
Example 1: There are two passengers 1 and 2 in the compartment of a
train, where 1 is a smoker and 2 is a non-smoker. The train company is to
decide either to respect the smoker0s desire to smoke freely, or to respect the
non-smoker0s desire not to be imposed secondary smoking. The company0s
problem is to choose from the set of various game forms, which includes the
following two game forms.
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where (s,l) is the culmination outcome such that the smoker smokes and the
non-smoker leaves the compartment. The consequential outcomes (ns,r)a n d
(s,r) may be interpreted similarly.




2 ,g γ∗)i sd e ﬁned by M
γ∗
1 = {(s|p,ns|
np),ns},w h e r e( s|p,ns|np) = “to smoke if the non-smoker permits it, not to
4smoke if the non-smoker does not permit it” and ns = “not to smoke no matter
what”, M
γ∗
2 = {p · r,p · l,np},w h e r ep · r = “to permit the smoker to smoke
and remain in the compartment”, p · l = “to permit the smoker to smoke and
leave the compartment if and only if the smoker indeed smokes” and np =
“not to permit the smoker to smoke”, and gγ∗ is deﬁned by
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Note that the set of culmination outcomes is given by A = {(s,l),(ns,r),(s,
r)}. Note also that the company confers on the smoker (resp. the non-smoker)
the right for free smoking (resp.t h er i g h tf o rc l e a na i r )i fi tc h o o s e st h eg a m e
form γ (resp. γ∗).
The gist of this example is that the social choice of a game form is tanta-
mount to the initial conferment of individual rights. This social choice issue
should be solved by designing and implementing a democratic social decision
procedure for initial conferment of individual rights. This analysis can be
based on the conceptual framework developed by Pattanaik and Suzumura
(1994; 1996), which proposed to capture the intuitive conception of decision-
making procedure as a carrier of intrinsic value beyond the instrumental use-
fulness thereof in realizing valuable culmination outcomes. The model of social
decision-making consists of two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, the society decides
on the game form rights-system to be promulgated. In the second stage, the
promulgated game form rights-system, coupled with the revealed proﬁle of in-
dividual preference orderings over the set of culmination outcomes, determine
a fully-ﬂedged game, and the play of this game determines a culmination out-
5come at the Nash equilibrium.4 It may deserve emphasis that this two-stage
social choice procedure has a sharply contrasting feature vis-` a-vis the classical
Arrow (1963) social choice framework. In the classical framework, it is the cul-
mination outcome that is socially chosen, whereas our two-stage social choice
framework visualizes a procedure where it is the game form rights-system that
is socially chosen, the culmination outcome being determined through the de-
centralized play of the game.
How then, should we articulate the ﬁrst stage social decision-making pro-
cedure? In this paper, each individual is assumed to have an ordering function
Qi,w h i c ha s s i g n sa ne x t e n d e do r d e r i n gQi(R)o v e rt h ep a i r so fg a m ef o r m s
and realized culmination outcomes to the proﬁle R.5 Let Ψ be the social ag-
gregator, to be called the extended constitution function, which maps each ad-
missible proﬁle of individual ordering functions into a social ordering function.
It is this social ordering function that determines the game form rights-system
4We may illustrate this two-stage framework by means of Example 1. Suppose that the
two passengers have their own preference orderings over the set of culmination outcomes A,
together forming the following proﬁle R =( R1,R 2):
R1 :( s,l) Â1 (s,r) Â1 (ns,r);R2 :( ns,r) Â2 (s,l) Â2 (s,r),
where a Âi b denotes that i ∈ {1,2} prefers a to b.G i v e n t h i s p r o ﬁle R,( s,l)i st h e
unique pure strategy Nash equilibirum outcome of the game (γ,R), whereas (ns,r)i st h e
unique pure strategy Nash equilibirum outcome of the game (γ∗,R). For the sake of further
argument, let us assume that γ∗ is the socially chosen game form. Since γ∗ is chosen in the
ﬁrst stage before the proﬁle R is revealed, the two individuals play the game (γ∗,R)i nt h e
second stage, and the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium outcome (ns,r)w i l le m e r g ea s
a consequence.
5In Example 1,( ( ns,r),γ∗)Qi(R)((s,l),γ) means that the situation where (ns,r)i s
realized as a Nash equilibrium outcome of the game (γ∗,R) is at least as desirable for i as
the situation where (s,l) is realized as a Nash equilibrium outcome of the game (γ,R).
6to be socially chosen and promulgated as the rule of the game to be played in
the second stage. Within this conceptual framework, the crucial task in the
analysis of social choice of game form rights-system is to show the existence
of a “reasonable” extended constitution function Ψ.I n t h i s p a p e r , w e w i l l
introduce several axioms on Ψ to identify the conditions which qualify an ex-
tended constitution function to be “reasonable.” Also, we will propose several
conditions which identify the class of liberal game forms. Since the concept of
game forms itself has very little, if any, to do with liberal rights-systems, we
should discuss what conditions are needed to characterize the liberal rights-
systems. To sum up, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the possibility
of reasonable extended constitution functions, in terms of which a liberal game
form can be rationally chosen.
1.3. Other Related Literature
A scheme similar to ours is pursued by Koray (2000) in the sense that Koray
also addresses himself to the social choice of social decision rules. One of
the crucial diﬀerences between us is that the social decision rules envisaged
by Koray are the conventional social choice functions, whereas we focus on
the social decision rules as game forms. Another diﬀerence is that Koray was
concerned only about the consequential values of social decision rules, whereas
we are interested in consequential as well as non-consequential values of social
d e c i s i o nr u l e sa sg a m ef o r m s .W es h o u l da lso note that the main result of Koray
is an impossibility theorem, whereas our main results are possibility theorems.
This contrast is mainly due to the social concern about non-consequential
values of game forms which our framework may capture.
Apart from this introduction, the paper consists of four sections and an
7appendix. Section 2 explains our basic model of extended social alternatives
and game form rights-systems. It also deﬁnes the extended constitution func-
tion. Section 3 introduces the basic Arrovian axioms which identify democratic
extended constitution functions, ande x p l a i n sw h a tw em e a nb yg a m ef o r m s
being liberal. Section 4 identiﬁes a set of conditions that guarantees the exis-
tence of an extended constitution function, which enables the society to decide
on the initial conferment of liberal game form rights-system when all indi-
viduals are self-interested. In contrast, Section 5 brieﬂy disucusses the case
where individuals are ethically motivated. Section 6 concludes, and Appendix
gathers involved proofs.
2. Basic Model
2.1. Description of Social States
The society consists of n individuals, where 2 ≤ n<+∞.Nis the set
of all individuals, viz., N = {1, ···,i,···,n}. A is the set of feasible social
states.I nw h a tf o l l o w s ,i ti sa s s u m e dt h a t3≤ #A<+∞. For each individual
i ∈ N, Ri ⊆ A × A denotes i0s (weak) preference ordering deﬁned over A.
For any x,y ∈ A,(x,y) ∈ Ri,o rm o r eb r i e ﬂy xRiy,m e a n st h a tx is at
least as good as y from i0sv i e w p o i n t .P (Ri)a n dI (Ri) denote, respectively,
the strict preference relation and the indiﬀerence relation corresponding to
Ri.T h u s , xP(Ri)y if and only if [xRiy & not yRix], and xI(Ri)y if and
only if [xRiy & yRix]. R denotes the universal set of preference orderings
deﬁned over A.A nn-tuple R =( R1,···,R i,···,R n) of individual preference
orderings, one ordering for each individual, is a proﬁle of individual preference
orderings over A. Rn denotes the universal set of logically conceivable proﬁles.
To articulate individual rights in our framework, we introduce rights-systems
8as game forms. A game form is the pair γ =( M,g), where M ≡
Q
i∈N Mi and
Mi is the set of permissible strategies for individual i ∈ N,a n dg : M → A
is the outcome function which speciﬁes, for each strategy proﬁle m ∈ M,a
feasible outcome g(m) ∈ A. We assume that g is surjective, viz., g (M)=A.
The universal set of game forms is Γ.
Given a proﬁle R ∈ Rn and a game form γ =( M,g) ∈ Γ,ap a i r( γ,R)
deﬁnes a non-cooperative game. In this paper, we adopt the Nash equilibrium
concept: given a game (γ,R), a strategy proﬁle m∗ ∈ M is a Nash equilibrium
in pure strategies, Nash equilibrium for short, if g(m∗)Rig(mi,m∗
−i)h o l d sf o r
all i ∈ N and all mi ∈ Mi.6 The set of all Nash equilibria of the game (γ,R)
is ²(γ,R). A conceivable social outcome x∗ ∈ A is a Nash equilibrium outcome
o ft h eg a m e( γ,R) if there exists a Nash equilibrium m∗ ∈ ²(γ,R) satisfying
x∗ = g(m∗). The set of all Nash equilibrium outcomes of the game (γ,R)i s
τ (γ,R).
2.2. Social Decision Procedure for Rule Selection
Let us visualize the two-stage social decision procedure in the general setting.
To begin with, every individual expresses his value judgements on the social de-
sirability of alternative methods of conferring game form rights-system. Then,
all individuals engage in debates about each other0s value judgements, provid-
ing justiﬁcations for their own values, and oﬀering criticisms of values held by
others. Sooner or later, there comes the stage where debate must stop and ac-
tion must be taken by the society. In the primordial stage of rule selection,t h e
social decision is made on the rights-system to be promulgated by aggregating
6For every i ∈ N and every m ∈ M,l e tm−i ≡ (m1,···,m i−1,m i+1,···,m n)a n d
M−i ≡ Πj6=iMj. For every i ∈ N,e v e r ym0




9individuals0 value judgements regarding the initial rights-conferment through
some democratic social decision procedure. After the rights-system as a game
form γ ∈ Γ is promulgated, and the proﬁle of individual preference orderings
R ∈ Rn on the set of culmination outcomes is revealed, a fully-ﬂedged game
(γ,R)i sp l a y e di nt h erealization stage of the conferred game form rights-
system, which determines a Nash equilibrium social outcome x∗ ∈ τ(γ,R)i f
²(γ,R) 6= ∅.
To make this scenario precise, we invoke the extended social choice frame-
work by Pattanaik and Suzumura (1994; 1996).7 For every x ∈ A and every
γ ∈ Γ,ap a i r( x,γ) ∈ A × Γ is an extended (social) alternative.G i v e n R ∈
Rn,( x,γ)i ss a i dt ob erealizable at R if and only if x ∈ τ (γ,R) holds. The
intended interpretation is that the social outcome x is realized through the
exercise of rights-system γ when the proﬁle R prevails. In what follows, Λ(R)
denotes the set of all realizable extended alternatives at R,v i z . ,
Λ(R)={(x,γ) | x ∈ τ(γ,R)&γ ∈ Γ}.
The social decision procedure is formulated as follows. First, each individ-
ual i0s value judgements on the desirability of rights-systems are assumed to
be represented by an ordering function Qi : Rn ³ (A × Γ)2 such that, for
7This framework due to Pattanaik and Suzumura capitalizes on the insightful observation
by Arrow (1963, pp.89-90): “Up to now, no attempt has been made to ﬁnd guidance by
considering the components of the vector which deﬁnes the social state. One especially
interesting analysis of this sort considers that, among the variables which taken together
deﬁne the social state, one is the very process by which the society makes its choice. This
is especially important if the mechanism of choice itself has a value to the individuals in
the society. For example, an individual may have a positive preference for achieving a
given distribution through the free market mechanism over achieving the same distribution
through rationing by the government.” See, also, Suzumura (1996; 1999; 2000; 2007).
10each R ∈ Rn, Qi(R) ⊆ Λ(R) × Λ(R) is a complete and transitive relation
(ordering) deﬁned over Λ(R). P (Qi(R)) and I (Qi(R)) stand for the asym-
metric part and the symmetric part of Qi(R), respectively. By deﬁnition,
(x,γ)Qi(R)(x0,γ0) means that, according to i0s value judgements, having a
social outcome x through the play of the game (γ,R)i sa tl e a s ta sg o o df o r
the society as having a social outcome x0 through the play of the game (γ0,R).
Let Q be the set of all logically possible ordering functions.
In the second place, the democratic procedure for aggregating individual
v a l u ej u d g e m e n t si sd e ﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 1: An extended constitution function (ECF) is a function Ψ which
maps each and every proﬁle of individual ordering functions Q =( Qi)i∈N in
an appropriate domain ∆Ψ ⊆ Qn into a social ordering function Q, viz.,
Q = Ψ(Q) ∈ Q for every Q ∈ ∆Ψ.
This concept is due originally to Pattanaik and Suzumura (1996), which
is a natural extension of the Arrovian social welfare function or constitution
function [Arrow (1963)]. Note that, in the present framework as well as in
that of Pattanaik and Suzumura (1996), there are two types of individual
preference orderings. One is an individual0s preference ordering Ri over A,
which represents i0s subjective tastes over the set of culmination outcomes.
The other is i0s ordering function Qi, which represents i0s value judgements
over the set of extended alternatives.8 The latter preferences constitute the
informational basis of the ECF to select a rights-system in the primordial stage
8Note that the individual ordering function does not have to be ethical in nature. It may
generate a selﬁsh extended preference ordering, where Qi expresses i0s selﬁsh judgements if
and only if, for every R ∈ Rn and every (x,γ),(x0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R), (x,γ)Qi(R)(x0,γ0)( r e s p .
(x,γ)P (Qi(R))(x0,γ0)) holds if and only if xRix0 (resp. xP (Ri)x0) holds.
11of rule selection, whereas the former preferences serve as the informational basis
for realizing a feasible social outcome in the realization stage of conferred game
form rights-system.
Given an ECF Ψ,w ed e ﬁne the associated rational social choice function
as follows. For each proﬁle of individual ordering functions Q ∈ ∆Ψ,a n df o r
each proﬁle of individual preference orderings R ∈ Rn,t h es e to fg a m ef o r m s
chosen through Ψ is given by
C(Ψ(Q);R) ≡ {γ ∈ Γ | ∃ x ∈ A, ∀(x0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R):( x,γ)Q(R)(x0,γ0),
where Q = Ψ(Q)}.
3. Basic Axioms
3.1. Democratic Extended Constitution Functions
What are the properties that qualify an ECF to be “reasonable”? Our ﬁrst
requirement is that Ψ is minimally democratic in the Paretian sense that the
unanimous individual judgements are faithfully reﬂected in the social judge-
ments in the following two senses.
Strong Pareto Principle (SP): For every Q ∈ ∆Ψ, every R ∈ Rn, and every
(x,γ),(x0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R), (x,γ)Qi(R)(x0,γ0) for all i ∈ N and (x,γ)P(Qj(R))(x0,γ0)
for some j ∈ N imply (x,γ)P(Q(R))(x0,γ0), where Q = Ψ(Q).
Pareto Indiﬀerence Principle (PI): For every Q ∈ ∆Ψ, every R ∈ Rn,
and every (x,γ),(x0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R), (x,γ)I(Qi(R))(x0,γ0) for all i ∈ N implies
(x,γ)I(Q(R))(x0,γ0), where Q = Ψ(Q).
The next requirement is a version of the Arrovian independence of irrelevant
alternatives [Arrow (1963)] in our framework of extended alternatives.
12Independence (I): For every R ∈ Rn, every Q, Q0 ∈ ∆Ψ, and every (x,γ),
(x0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R), if (x,γ)Qi(R)(x0,γ0) ⇔ (x,γ)Q0
i(R)(x0,γ0) holds for all i ∈
N, then (x,γ)Q(R)(x0,γ0) ⇔ (x,γ)Q0(R)(x0,γ0) h o l d sa sw e l l , where Q =
Ψ(Q) and Q0 = Ψ(Q0).
For every R ∈ Rn and given an ECF Ψ, an individual d ∈ N is called
an R-dictator under Ψ if, for every Q ∈ ∆Ψ and every (x,γ),(x0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R),
(x,γ)P(Qd(R))(x0,γ0) implies (x,γ)P(Q(R))(x0,γ0), where Q = Ψ(Q). The
last democratic requirement on Ψ is as follows.
Non-Dictatorship (ND): For every R ∈ Rn, t h e r ei sn oR-dictator under
Ψ.
Note that these four requirements on the extended constitution function are
natural extensions of Arrow’s axioms on the standard Arrovian constitution
function [Arrow (1963)], except for the parametric role played by R in the
deﬁnition of a dictator under Ψ.
3.2. Uniform Rationality of Social Choice Functions
In the second place, we want Ψ to generate uniformly rational social choice
functions in the sense that it satisﬁes the following property.
Uniformity of Rational Choice (URC): For every Q ∈ ∆Ψ,
∩R∈RnC(Ψ(Q);R) 6= ∅.
If this condition is satisﬁed and γ∗ is chosen from this intersection, γ∗ applies
uniformly to every future realization of R ∈ Rn.S i n c et h eg a m ef o r mi st h e
formal method of specifying the initial conferment of rights-system in the soci-
ety prior to the realization of the proﬁle of individual preference orderings over
13culmination outcomes, it seems desirable to design the extended constitution
function satisfying the condition URC. Indeed, if we implement a game form
γ∗ ∈∩ R∈RnC(Q;R), γ∗ prevails as the rights-system no matter how frivolously
R may change.9,10
3.3. Nash Solvability, Liberalism, and Eﬃciency
In the third place, we introduce three “reasonable” requirements on the class of
game forms, which qualify these game forms to be relevant from the viewpoint
of welfare and rights. They embody a requirement of stability in the social
decision-making, a requirement of liberalism, and a requirement of social ef-
ﬁciency, respectively. The ﬁrst property is due to van Hees (1999), which is
well-known in game theory as the Nash solvability of a game form.11
Deﬁnition 2: A game form γ ∈ Γ is Nash solvable if τ (γ,R) is non-empty
for every proﬁle R ∈ Rn.
9It is true that the condition URC is strong, as it requires that the promulgated rules
of the game remain insensitive to the unforeseen changes in R ∈ Rn. It follows that the
conditions which guarantee the satisfaction of URC cannot but be stringent and go beyond
the consequentialist border of informational constraints.
10Another argument in favor of the condition URC may proceed as follows. Sup-
pose that an individual i ∈ N,ap r o ﬁle R ∈ Rn, and an ordering R∗
i are such that
{γ} = C(Q;R),{x} = τ(γ,R),{γ∗} = C(Q;(R∗
i;R−i)), and {x∗} = τ(γ∗,(R∗
i;R−i))
satisfy x∗P(Ri)x or xP(R∗
i)x∗. In this case, either C(Q;R) is manipulable by means of
R∗
i,o rC(Q;( R∗
i;R−i)) is manipulable by means of Ri. The condition URC excludes the
possibility of such manipulability.
11The Nash solvability plays an important role in the game form formulation of libertarian
rights. Indeed, Peleg (1998) formulated the Gibbard paradox [Gibbard (1974)] in the game
form formulation by means of the fact that the game form is not Nash solvable. Furthermore,
Peleg, Peters and Storchen (2002) identiﬁed a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the Nash
solvability with the purpose of providing a resolution of the Gibbard paradox.
14Let ΓNS denote the subclass of Γ which consists solely of the Nash solvable
game forms.
The second property is related to the intrinsic value of libertarian rights-
system. As an auxiliary step, we introduce the α-eﬀectivity function of a game
form, which enables us to capture the (veto) power structure which a game
form confers to individuals. Given a game form γ =( M,g), the associated α-





B ⊆ A | ∃mS ∈ MS,∀mN\S ∈ MN\S : g(mS,mN\S) ∈ B
ª
,
where MS ≡ Πi∈SMi and MN\S ≡ Πi∈N\SMi.
The concept of the α-eﬀectivity function enables us to identify two types
of game forms. Note that we are hereby using somewhat abusive expression
such as Eγ(i) instead of Eγ({i})f o re v e r yi ∈ N.
Deﬁnition 3: Ag a m ef o r mγ =( M,g) ∈ Γ is dictatorial if there exists a
unique individual i ∈ N, to be called the dictator of γ, such that Eγ (i)=
2A\{∅} and Eγ (j)={A} for every j 6= i. A dictatorial game form in which
i ∈ N is the dictator is called the i-dictatorial game form.
For each i ∈ N, Γ(i) denotes the set of all i-dictatorial game forms.
Deﬁnition 4 [Peleg (1998)]: A game form γ =( M,g) ∈ Γ satisﬁes minimal
liberalism if there exist at least two individuals i,j ∈ N such that there are
Bi ∈ Eγ (i) and Bj ∈ Eγ (j) with Bi 6= A 6= Bj.
In fact, the property of minimal liberalism may not be attractive in many per-
son society, as it is compatible with the possibility of duopolistic allocation of
15eﬀective powers in the presence of many other individuals with no power what-
soever. To avoid such a duopolistic power structure in many person society,
we introduce a slightly stronger version of minimal liberalism.
Deﬁnition 5: Ag a m ef o r mγ =( M,g) ∈ Γ is liberal if every individual i ∈ N
has an eﬀective power so that there exists Bi ∈ Eγ (i) with Bi 6= A.
Let ΓL denote the subclass of Γ which consists solely of liberal game forms.
The third property is the consequentialist value of social eﬃciency.
Deﬁnition 6: A game form γ ∈ Γ is eﬃcient if, for every proﬁle R ∈ Rn,
there exists a Pareto eﬃcient Nash equilibrium outcome in A whenever τ (γ,R)
is non-empty.
We denote the set of eﬃcient game forms by ΓPE.
The condition of eﬃciency is particularly relevant in the context of liberal
paradox in the game form formulation of individual rights. Recollect that
Deb, Pattanaik, and Razzolini (1997) proposed two notions of liberal paradox:
strong paradox and weak paradox. The former says that, for some preference
proﬁle, every Nash equilibrium outcome is Pareto ineﬃcient, whereas the latter
says that, for some preference proﬁle, there is a Nash equilibrium outcome
which is Pareto ineﬃcient. According to this classiﬁcation, the existence of an
eﬃcient game form deﬁned above resolves the strong paradox, but not the weak
paradox. Although the resolution of the weak paradox is preferable to that
of the strong paradox, it is a desideratum which is impossible to attain, since
any game form satisfying minimal liberalism should have a Pareto ineﬃcient
outcome for some preference proﬁle, as Peleg (1998) has shown.
We can show that there exists a game form which satisﬁes all of the above
three conditions.
16Proposition 1: There exists a game form γ∗ ∈ ΓNS ∩ ΓL ∩ ΓPE.
According to Peleg, Peters and Storchen (2002), the Nash solvability is equiva-
lent to the claim that, for every preference proﬁle, there exists a weakly Pareto
eﬃcient Nash equilibrium outcome. Since we are requiring not weak Pareto
eﬃciency, but strong Pareto eﬃciency, we cannot simply invoke their equiva-
lence theorem in the context of verifying the validity of Proposition 1.
4. On the Existence of Reasonable ECF
Under what domain restrictions on the acceptable class of proﬁles of individual
ordering functions can we construct an ECF which is not only consistent with
the four Arrovian axioms of SP, PI, I,a n dND, but also is capable of choosing
a liberal game form? What about the stringent, but highly desirable property
of uniformly rational choice of game form rights-system?
In what follows, we deﬁne a subclass S of individual ordering functions
which may be called the self-interested class, and ask about the existence of
an ECF which is workable for every proﬁle of individual ordering functions
within this speciﬁed class.
The deﬁnition of S goes as follows: for every i ∈ N, Qi ∈ S implies, for
every R ∈ Rn and every (x,γ),(x0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R), that
(a) if γ = γ0,t h e n( x,γ)Qi(R)(x0,γ0) if and only if xRix0;a n d
(b) if x = x0,t h e nEγ(i) ⊇ (resp. )) Eγ0(i) implies (x,γ)Qi(R)(x0,γ0)( r e s p .
(x,γ)P(Qi(R))(x0,γ0)).
The meaning of the ﬁrst restriction (a) should be clear: whenever the two
extended alternatives (x,γ)a n d( x0,γ0)s h a r et h es a m eg a m ef o r mγ = γ0,
then the evaluation by Qi over the pair (x,γ)a n d( x0,γ0) is in accordance with
17his personal preferences Ri over the pair of culmination outcomes x and x0.
It means that this individual transcribes his selﬁsh preferences over the set of
culmination outcomes at least partly into his value judgements over the set of
extended alternatives. The second restriction (b) says that whenever the two
extended alternatives (x,γ)a n d( x0,γ0) share the same culmination outcome
x = x0, Qi prefers (x,γ)t o( x0,γ0)a te v e r yR ∈ Rn with (x,γ),(x0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R)
as long as γ endows i with more eﬀective power than γ0 does. Hence Qi deserves
to the name of self-interested preferences.
Although Sn is highly restrictive vis-` a-vis Qn, we cannot thereby exorcise
the Arrovian phantom. Indeed, we may show that, for every Ψ with ∆Ψ = Sn
which satisﬁes SP, PI and I, there exists d ∈ N such that C(Ψ(Q);R)=
C(Qd;R) for every Q ∈ Sn.M o r e o v e r ,i fΨ satisﬁes URC, then the class of
d-dictatorial game forms is uniformly chosen, viz., Γ(d) ⊆∩ R∈RnC(Ψ(Q);R)
for every Q ∈ Sn,a n d∩Q∈Sn ∩R∈Rn C(Ψ(Q);R)=Γ(d). See Suzumura and
Yoshihara (2008) for details.
The message of this assertion is simple.I ts a y st h a tt h eA r r o v i a ni m p o s s i -
bility result cannot be avoided in the present context of social choice of game
form rights-system even on the strongly restrictive self-interested domain.
How, then, can we enable a society with self-interested population to ﬁnd
a method for conferring a liberal rights-system through a non-dictatorial pro-
cedure? To answer this question in the aﬃrmative, we introduce a further
restriction on the self-interested domain Sn.
As an auxiliary step, let us deﬁne, for every j ∈ N, a subset Γ0
j ⊆ Γ by
Γ
0
j ≡ {γ ∈ Γ | E
γ(j)={A}}.
Intuitively speaking, Γ0
j consists of game forms in which j is powerless in terms
of eﬀectivity. Note in particular that the set of all i-dictatorial game forms















Intuitively speaking, Γu(i) consists of game forms in which somebody other
than i ∈ N is unprivileged in the sense of being powerless in terms of eﬀectivity,
whereas Γp(i) consists of game forms in which nobody other than i ∈ N is
unprivileged in the same sense.
By means of these auxiliary concepts, we deﬁne a class of coalitions Ni(Q) ⊆
2N\{i} for every i ∈ N and Q ∈ Sn as follows: for every S ⊆ N\{i}, S ∈ Ni(Q)
if and only if, for every γ ∈ Γp(i), every γ0 ∈ Γu(i)w i t hEγ0
(S)={A},e v e r y
R,R0 ∈ Rn,e v e r y( x,γ),(x0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R), and every (y,γ),(y0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R0),
there exists at least one j ∈ S such that the following condition is satisﬁed,
where (n-c) is named after non-consequentialism:
(x,γ)Qj(R)(x0,γ0) ⇔ (y,γ)Qj(R0)(y0,γ0). (n-c)
Thus, S ∈ Ni (Q)m e a n st h a ti fγ0 deprives all members in S taken together of
their eﬀective power, and at least some member in S of his/her eﬀective power,
whereas γ does not deprive any member in S of his/her eﬀective power, then
there should be some member j ∈ S who ranks at Qj the game form γ at least
as high as the game form γ0, regardless of the culmination outcomes which γ
19and γ0 bring about at R and R0, respectively. Taking the condition (b) of S
into consideration, it follows that the set Ni (Q)i st h ec l a s so fc o a l i t i o n si n
N \{i}, each element of which contains at least one member who consistently
values at Q, regardless of the culmination outcomes which may emerge, the
protection of rights of all members of S higher than i’s potential dictatorship.
Then we may assert the following general possibility theorem.
Theorem 1: For every i ∈ N, there exists an ECF Ψ with ∆Ψ ⊆ Sn that
satisﬁes SP, PI, I, ND, and that ∅ 6= C(Ψ(Q);R) ⊆ ΓNS ∩ ΓL ∩ ΓPE holds
for every Q ∈ ∆Ψ and every R ∈ Rn if ∩Q∈∆ΨNi(Q) ⊇ 2N\{i}\{∅}.
The gist of Theorem 1 is easy to explain. If every individual other than i is
resolute enough to insist that the complete deprivation of his/her rights should
be rejected no matter what may subsequently happen in the realization stage
of the conferred rights, then his/her rights in terms of eﬀective power can be
protected through the democratic social decision procedure. Since the game
form γ∗ ∈ C(Ψ(Q);R) belongs to ΓL, γ∗ is not only non-dictatorial, but also
confers liberty on every individual including i himself. 12
12The proof of Theorem 1 is relegated to Appendix for the sake of simplifying the
exposition of the main text. It may facilitate the understanding of Theorem 1, however,
if we explain the structure of ECF constructed in its proof. It hinges on the two-tier social
ordering function in the following sense: if a pair (x,γ),(x0,γ0)i ss u c ht h a tγ ∈ Γp(i)a n d
γ0 ∈ Γu(i), then Q(R) always ranks (x,γ) higher than (x0,γ0) regardless of what R ∈ Rn
may materialize, and if the pair is such that both (x,γ)a n d( x0,γ0) belong to Γp(i), then
Q(R) should be consistent with the two Pareto conditions SP and PI.
Why does Ψ perform nicely as Theorem 1 asserts? Suppose that individual i is a
potential dictator. Take a pair (x,γ),(x0,γ0) such that γ ∈ Γp(i)a n dγ0 ∈ Γu(i). Then,
∩Q∈∆ΨNi(Q) ⊇ 2N\{i}\{∅} implies that somebody other than i,s a yj,w h oi sp o w e r l e s s
in γ0, ranks (x,γ) higher than (x0,γ0) regardless of which R ∈ Rn may materialize, and
20According to Theorem 1, there exists a Ψ such that C(Ψ(Q);R) consists
solely of Nash solvable, eﬃcient, and liberal game forms. Note, however, that
if #N ≥ 3, there exists a class of Nash solvable, eﬃcient, and non-dictatorial
game forms which are not satisfactory from the point of view of liberty. This
is the class of King-maker mechanisms due to Hurwicz and Schmeidler (1978):





h = A for every h ∈ N \{ i},a n dgKi(m)=mmi for every
m ∈ MKi. In view of this fact, it may be of some interest that the following
corollary of Theorem 1 holds true.
Corollary 1: For every i ∈ N,γKi / ∈ ΓNS ∩ ΓL ∩ ΓPE.
ranks (y,γ)h i g h e rt h a n( y0,γ0) whenever (y,γ)a n d( y0,γ0) are realizable at any other
R0 ∈ Rn. On the basis of the existence of such a protesting individual, the non-dictatorial
Paretian Ψ may deﬁne a social ordering function Q(R) with the two-tier structure described
above. Then, the rational choice set C(Ψ(Q);R) becomes a subset of Γp(i). However, Γp(i)
may contain game forms in which i is powerless. Let γ be such a game form and (x,γ)b e
realizable at R ∈ Rn. As is shown in Appendix, there exists a liberal game form γ∗ such that
(x,γ∗) is realizable at R. Then, since ∆Ψ ⊆ Sn, i ranks (x,γ∗)h i g h e rt h a n( x,γ)b ym e a n s
of Qi at R, which enables the corresponding social ordering Q(R)t or a n k( x,γ∗)h i g h e r
than (x,γ)a tR,s i n c eΨ is Paretian. Thus, the rational choice set C(Ψ(Q);R) becomes a
subset of ΓL. Moreover, any game form in C(Ψ(Q);R)r e p r e s e n t samaximalfreedom [van
Hees (1999)], as we discuss in Appendix, which makes any game form in C(Ψ(Q);R) Nash
solvable and eﬃcient.
Thus, given the society with self-interested individuals, we can deﬁne a social decision
procedure that chooses liberal, Nash solvable, and eﬃcient rights-system. This procedure
consists of two components: one is the mechanism Ψ with the simple two-tier structure,
and the other is the individuals’ protest against the complete deprivation of their own rights
in eﬀective power. The importance of the second component is worth emphasizing, as the
mechanism design of ECF per se may be incapable of securing nice properties in the absence
of individuals’ attitudes towards protecting their own rights.
21Proof.B yd e ﬁnition, the α-eﬀectivity function EγKi associated with γKi has
EγKi(h)={A} for every h ∈ N, which implies that γKi is not a liberal game
form.
Combined with Theorem 1,i tf o l l o w st h a tany King-maker mechanism cannot
be rationally chosen via Ψ even when ∩Q∈∆ΨNi(Q) ⊇ 2N\{i} \{ ∅}.
Observe, however, that Theorem 1 falls short of guaranteeing the uniform
rational choice of a liberal game form. To secure the desirable property of
uniformity, we must introduce another domain restriction. For every Q ∈
Sn deﬁne a class of coalitions Mi(Q) ⊆ 2N as follows: for every S ⊆ N,
S ∈ Mi(Q) if and only if, for every γ,γ0 ∈ Γp(i), every R, R0 ∈ Rn,e v e r y
(x,γ),(x0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R), and every (y,γ),(y0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R0), there exists at least
one individual j ∈ S such that Qj satisﬁes the condition (n-c).W em a yt h e n
assert the following:
Theorem 2: For every i ∈ N, there exists an ECF Ψ with ∆Ψ ⊆ Sn such
that SP, PI, I, ND and ∅ 6= ∩R∈RnC(Ψ(Q);R) ⊆ ΓNS ∩ ΓL ∩ ΓPE holds for
every Q ∈ ∆Ψ if ∩Q∈∆ΨNi(Q) ⊇ 2N\{i}\{∅} and ∩Q∈∆ΨMi(Q) ⊇ 2N\{∅}.
According to Theorem 2, if every individual has only the non-consequential
preferences on rights-systems, it is not only possible to resolve the Arrovian
impossibility impasse, but it is also possible to protect every individual0s lib-
erty in terms of his/her eﬀective power, and to choose uniformly rational,
liberal, Nash solvable, and Pareto eﬃcient game form as a rights-system to be
promulgated.
Before concluding this section, it is worthwhile to examine the following
augmented Example 1, which may facilitate the understanding of what The-
orem 1 asserts.
22Example 2: Let us augment Example 1 by introducing two dictatorial game





















11= “to smoke in the presence of 2”, m
γ1
12=“to smoke in the absence
of 2”, and m
γ1
13=“not to smoke in the presence of 2”, and the outcome function

















2h)=( ns,r) for all h ∈ H.



















21 = “to force 1 to
s m o k ea n dl e a v et h ec o m p a r t m e n t ” ,m
γ2
22 =“ t of o r c e1n o tt os m o k ea n d
remain in the compartment” and m
γ2
23 = “ to force 1 to smoke and remain in

















23)=( s,r)f o ra l lk ∈ K.
Given the proﬁle R =( R1,R 2)t h a ti sd e ﬁn e di nf o o t n o t e4 ,w em a yc h e c k
that τ(γ1,R)={(s,l)} and τ(γ2,R)={(ns,r)}.
Let us now check whether or not γ,γ∗,γ1 and γ2 are capable of being chosen
by means of an ECF Ψ in Theorem 1. To begin with, it is clear that
Eγ (1) = Ω({(s,l),(s,r)}) ∪ Ω({(ns,r)});
Eγ (2) = Ω({(s,l),(ns,r)}) ∪ Ω({(s,r),(ns,r)});
Eγ∗ (1) = Ω({(ns,r)}),Eγ∗ (2) = Ω({(ns,r)});
23Eγ1 (1) = Ω({(ns,r)}) ∪ Ω({(s,l)}) ∪ Ω({(s,l)}),Eγ1 (2) = {A};a n d
Eγ2
(1) = {A},Eγ2
(2) = Ω({(ns,r)}) ∪ Ω({(s,r)}) ∪ Ω({(s,l)}),
where Ω(B) denotes the family of sets consisting of B and all its supersets in
A.
We may also verify that, for any game form δ ∈ {γ,γ∗,γ1,γ2}, there exists no
game form δ
0 ∈ Γ such that δ
0 power-dominates δ in the sense that Eδ0
(i) ⊇
Eδ(i)f o ri =1a n d2 ,a n dEδ0
(j) ) Eδ(j)f o rj = 1 or 2. Furthermore, γ and
γ∗ are liberal game forms, whereas γ1 and γ2 are not. By virtue of Lemma
1 in Appendix, for any game form δ ∈ {γ,γ∗}, there exists a Nash solvable,
liberal and Pareto eﬃcient game form δ
∗ such that Eδ = Eδ∗
,w h i c hw ew i l l
denote by δ
∗(γ)a n dδ
∗(γ∗). According to Theorem 1, δ
∗(γ)a n dδ
∗(γ∗), being
in ΓNS ∩ ΓL ∩ ΓPE, are eligible from Γ. However, whether or not any one of
δ
∗(γ)a n dδ
∗(γ∗) is chosen, or a game form in (ΓNS∩ΓL∩ΓPE)\{δ
∗(γ),δ
∗(γ∗)}
is chosen instead, hinges squarely on the proﬁle Q =( Q1,Q 2), and lies outside
the reach of the design of the mechanism Ψ itself.
5. Ethical Domain: Alternative Avenue to Possibility
Theorems
In the context of social choice theoretic articulation of libertarian rights, there
are several conspicuous attempts in the literature to resolve the Pareto libertar-
ian paradox by introducing some ethical constraints on the class of admissible
proﬁles, or on the attitudes of people towards others within their personal
spheres, or the combination of both.13 It is interesting to see how the ethical
constraints can be articulated within the game form formulation of libertar-
ian rights, and how they aﬀect the strenuous impossibility theorem in this
13For a survey of these social choice theoretic literature, see Suzumura (2008, Section 4.3).
24arena. The purpose of this section is to describe our theoretical scenario for
performing this plan without going into details.
To begin with, we deﬁne a non-consequentialist liberal ordering function by
the combination of two requirements. The ﬁrst requirement is that an ordering
function Q is liberal in the sense that γ ∈ ΓL and γ0 ∈ Γ \ ΓL necessarily im-
ply (x,γ)P(Q(R))(x0,γ0)f o re v e r yR ∈ Rn and every (x,γ),(x0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R).
The second requirement is that Q is non-consequentialist in the sense that
it satisﬁes the condition (n-c) for every γ,γ0 ∈ ΓL,e v e r yR,R0 ∈ Rn,e v -
ery (x,γ),(x0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R), and every (y,γ),(y0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R0). If an ordering
function Q is liberal as well as non-consequentialist, Q is said to be non-
consequentialist liberal. The target of this analysis is to identify some con-
ditions on the domain ∆Ψ of an extended constitution function Ψ and on
people’s attitudes towards others, so that Ψ can aggregate every proﬁle Q of
individual ordering functions in the suitably circumscribed domain ∆Ψ into a
non-consequentialist liberal social ordering function Ψ(Q)a n dt h a tt h es o c i a l l y
chosen game forms satisfy the following:
∅ 6= C(Ψ(Q);R) ⊆ ΓNS ∩ ΓL ∩ ΓPE for every R ∈ R
n.
In Suzumura and Yoshihara (2008), we have identiﬁed the necessary and
suﬃcient condition for the above property to hold. We have also identiﬁed the
suﬃcient condition for the stronger property of uniformity of rational choice:
∅ 6= ∩R∈RnC(Ψ(Q);R) ⊆ ΓNS ∩ ΓL ∩ ΓPE
for every Q ∈ ∆Ψ.
256. Concluding Remarks
Instead of summarizing the main contents of this paper, let us conclude it by
making three brief observations on the general nature of our analysis.
In the ﬁrst place, this paper represents a non-standard attempt to embody
non-consequentialism within the extended framework of social choice theory ` a
la Pattanaik and Suzumura (1996). In the context of the theory of welfare and
rights, which was ﬁrst explored by Sen (1970; 1970a) in terms of the impossi-
bility of a Paretian liberal, we have shown how the seldom-discussed problem
of initial conferment of libertarian rights-system can be neatly analyzed by
means of the Pattanaik-Suzumura framework. In particular, it is shown that
an extended constitution that satisﬁes Arrovian conditions of democratic social
decision-making exists, which can choose a game form rights-system satisfy-
ing Nash solvability, eﬃciency, liberalism and uniform applicability, whenever
individuals resolutely resist to the loss of their eﬀective libertarian power in
the initial conferment of individual rights-system even if doing so may result
in their welfare loss in terms of culmination outcomes. In this sense, it may be
understood as an attempt to pay non-consequentialist attention to the intrin-
sic value of social choice procedures. In this sense, it may be construed as the
counterpart to an earlier attempt by Suzumura and Xu (2001; 2004) within
the Arrovian social choice framework, which tried to pay non-consequentialist
attention to the intrinsic value of social choice opportunities.
In the second place, the possibility theorem in this paper cannot be se-
cured simply by means of the clever design of social choice mechanisms. The
eﬃcacy of our escape routes from the logical impasse of welfare and rights
hinges squarely on the individual attitudes towards intrinsic value of liberty.
In this sense, it has some family resemblance to the well-known resolution
26scheme within the context of social choice theoretic articulation of individual
rights, which is due to Sen (1976) and Suzumura (1978) where the concept
of a liberal indivudual plays a pivotal role. Recollect that “an individual is
said to be liberal [in the Sen-Suzumura scheme] if and only if he claims only
those parts of his preferences that are compatible with others’ preferences over
their respective protected spheres to count in social choice [Suzumura (1983,
p.196)].” It is the existence of such an individual who pays attention to the
social realization of individual libertarian rights that serves us as an ultimate
guarantee for the successful working of a liberal society.
In the third and last place, the rights conferment is a repeated exercise for
a society in view of the past performance of the previously conferred rights.
The present analysis is conﬁned to the initial segment of this larger problem.
The ﬁxed and ﬁnite set of individuals as well as the static analytical framework
is chosen for the sake of analyzing this tractable initial segment. The fully-
ﬂedged analysis of the rights-conferment may well require us to go far beyond
the present framework. Since the current state of the art falls much short of
attemping such an ambitious analysis, the limitation of the present paper may
be tolerated as our modest ﬁrst attempt.
Appendix: Proofs
For any R ∈ Rn and any Q ∈ ∆Ψ,w ed e ﬁne QN(R)b y( x,γ)QN(R)(y,γ0)
for all x,y ∈ A and γ,γ0 ∈ Γ if and only if (x,γ)Qh(R)(y,γ0)f o ra l lh ∈ N.
I (QN (R)) and P (QN (R)) are the symmetric part and the asymmetric part
of QN (R), respectively. Let a proﬁle R0 ∈ Rn be such that every individual is
universally indiﬀerent over A.G i v e nγ =( M,g) ∈ Γ,f o ra n yh ∈ N and any
mh ∈ Mh,l e tBh
mh ≡ g (mh,M h). Then, Eγ (h)=∪mh∈MhΩ(Bh
mh) for each and
27every h ∈ N, where and hereafter Ω(B) denotes the family of sets consisting
of B and all its supersets in A.G i v e nγ =( M,g) ∈ Γ and for every h ∈ N,l e t
Θ
γ
h be the set of minimal subsets in Eγ (h) in terms of set-theoretic inclusion.
Let us say that a game form γ ∈ Γ is power-dominated by another game
form γ0 ∈ Γ if and only if Eγ0 (i) ⊇ Eγ (i)f o ra l li ∈ N and Eγ0 (j) ) Eγ (j)f o r
some j ∈ N.Ag a m ef o r mγ∗ ∈ Γ represents a maximal power structure if there
is no other game form γ ∈ Γ which power-dominates γ∗. Let us denote by μ(Γ)
the set of game forms such that each member of μ(Γ) represents a maximal
power structure in Γ.G i v e nag a m ef o r mγ ∈ Γ, Eγ satisﬁes maximal freedom










¯ =1 .T h u s ,Eγ satisﬁes maximal freedom if γ represents a maximal
power structure in Γ, and the exercise of maximal power by each and every
individual is enough to identify a unique culmination outcome.
Proof of Proposition 1: For every game form γ =( M,g) ∈ Γ and culmina-
tion outcome x ∈ A,d e ﬁne a new game form γ0 =( M0,g0) ∈ Γ as follows: for
every h ∈ N, M0




g0 (m)=x if mh = x ∈ M0
h for some h ∈ N;
g0 (m)=g (m)o t h e r w i s e .
Then, Eγ0 (h)=Ω({x})f o re a c hh ∈ N.N o t e t h a t γ0 ∈ μ(Γ)h o l d st r u e .
This is because, for any γ00 ∈ Γ\{γ0},i fEγ00 (k) ⊇ Ω({x}) ∪ Ω(B)h o l d sf o r
some B ⊆ A\{x} and some k ∈ N,t h e n{x} / ∈ Eγ00 (h)h o l d sf o ra n yo t h e r
h 6= k.M o r e o v e r ,Θ
γ0
h = {{x}} holds for any h ∈ N in γ0. Thus, the associated
Eγ0
satisﬁes maximal freedom. Then, by Lemma 1 below, there exists a
Nash solvable and eﬃcient γ∗ ∈ μ(Γ)s u c ht h a tEγ∗ = Eγ0. Finally, since
Eγ∗ (h)=Ω({x})f o re a c hh ∈ N, γ∗ satisﬁes liberalism.
28Lemma 1: Assume that a game form γ ∈ Γ represents a maximal power
structure in Γ. Then, if the associated Eγ satisﬁes maximal freedom, there
exists a Nash solvable and eﬃcient γ∗ ∈ Γ such that Eγ∗
= Eγ.
Proof. By deﬁnition, γ ∈ μ(Γ) is such that Eγ satisﬁes maximal freedom.
According to van Hees (1999, Theorem 1), there exists γ∗ ∈ Γ which is Nash
solvable, eﬃcient, and induced by Eγ.
Lemma 2: Let a game form γ ∈ Γ be such that γ / ∈ μ(Γ). Then, for any R ∈
Rn and any (x,γ) ∈ Λ(R), there exists γ∗ ∈ μ(Γ) ∩ ΓL such that, for some
j ∈ N, Eγ∗ (j) ) Eγ (j) and (x,γ∗) ∈ Λ(R).
Proof. Given γ =( M,g) / ∈ μ(Γ), there exists at least one j ∈ N such that
Eγ (j) + Ω({x})a n dEγ (j) + Ω({y})f o ra n yy ∈ A\{x}. This is because, if
there exists k ∈ N such that Eγ (k) ⊇ Ω({y})f o rs o m ey ∈ A,t h e nf o ra n y
other h 6= k and any B ∈ Eγ (h), y ∈ B holds. Since γ / ∈ μ(Γ), there exists
j ∈ N\{k} such that {y} / ∈ Eγ (j). Thus, for this j and for any B ∈ Eγ (j),
y ∈ B holds, but {y} / ∈ Eγ (j), which implies that Eγ (j) + Ω({y0}) for every
y0 ∈ A.
For such j ∈ N,d e ﬁne γ0 =( M0,g 0) ∈ Γ as follows: M0
j = Mj ∪ {x} and
M0






x if mj = x ∈ M0
j;
g (m)o t h e r w i s e
for every m ∈ M0.B y c o n s t r u c t i o n , Eγ0 (j)=Eγ (j) ∪ Ω({x}). Also, if
(mx
h)h∈N ∈ ²(R,γ)w i t hx = g((mx
h)h∈N), then (mx
h)h∈N ∈ ²(R,γ0)w i t hx =
g0((mx
h)h∈N). If there is no B ∈ Θ
γ0
j such that |B| > 1a n dx / ∈ B,w ed e ﬁne
γ∗ =( M∗,g ∗) ∈ μ(Γ) as follows: M∗
j = M0
j for j ∈ N and M∗
h = M0
h ∪{x},f o r






x if mh = x ∈ M∗
h for some h ∈ N;
g0 (m)o t h e r w i s e .
Then, Eγ∗
(h)=Ω({x}) for every h ∈ N,a n dEγ∗
(j)=Eγ0
(j) ) Eγ (j).
Moreover, (mx
h)h∈N ∈ ²(R,γ∗)w i t hx = g∗((mx
h)h∈N).
If there exists B1 ∈ Θ
γ0
j with |B1| > 1a n dx / ∈ B1,w ec h o o s ea no u t c o m e
z1 ∈ B1 ∩ g0(M0
j,mx
−j) and deﬁne γ(1) =
¡
M(1),g (1)¢




j ∪ {z1} for j ∈ N, M
(1)
h = M0
h for h 6= j,a n dg(1) is deﬁned, for every






z1 if mj = z1 ∈ M
(1)
j ;
g0 (m)o t h e r w i s e .
By construction, Eγ(1) (j) ) Eγ0 (j)a n d( x,γ(1)) ∈ Λ(R). If there still exists
B2 ∈ Θ
γ(1)




−j), and deﬁne γ(2) =
¡
M(2),g(2)¢









h for h 6= j,a n dg(2) is deﬁned, for each






z2 if mj = z2 ∈ M
(2)
j ;
g(1) (m)o t h e r w i s e .




¯ ¯Bk+1¯ ¯ > 1a n dx,z1,...,zk / ∈ Bk+1,s i n c eA is ﬁnite

























30all h 6= j. To show that γ∗ ∈ μ(Γ), observe that if γ00 ∈ Γ\{γ∗} is such
that Eγ00
(j) ⊇ Eγ∗




(h)h o l d sf o ra n yo t h e rh 6= j.S e c o n d ,i fγ00 ∈ Γ\{γ∗}
is such that Eγ00 (h) ⊇ Eγ∗ (h) ∪ Ω(B)h o l d sf o rs o m eB + {x,z1,...,zk} and
some h 6= j, then there exists y ∈
©
x,z1,...,zkª
such that {y} / ∈ Eγ00 (j)
holds. Thus, γ∗ ∈ μ(Γ). To see γ∗ ∈ ΓL, let us examine γ(k−1).B e c a u s e
of the deﬁnition of γ(k), there exists at least one Bk ∈ Θ
γ(k−1)




¯ > 1, zk ∈ Bk,a n dx,z1,...,zk−1 / ∈ Bk,w h e r e a st h e r ei sn om o r e
B0k ∈ Θ
γ(k−1)
j in γ(k−1) such that
¯
¯B0k¯
¯ > 1, x,z1,...,zk−1 / ∈ B0k and zk / ∈ B0k.
Let zk+1 ∈ Bk\
©
zkª





and zk+1 / ∈
©
x,z1,...,zkª
.T h i si m p l i e st h a tγ∗ ∈ ΓL.
Such a game form γ∗ can be deﬁned as follows: M∗
j = M
(k)












⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
zl if mj = zl ∈ M
(k)
j ;
x if mj = x ∈ M0
j;
y




















h for some h 6= j;
g(k) (m)o t h e r w i s e .
Then, (mx
h)h∈N ∈ ²(R,γ∗)w i t hx = g∗((mx
h)h∈N), and Eγ∗ (j) ) Eγ (j).
31Lemma 3: Let a game form γ ∈ μ(Γ) be such that the associated Eγ does not
satisfy maximal freedom. Then, for every R ∈ Rn and every (x,γ) ∈ Λ(R),
there exists γ0 ∈ μ(Γ) such that the associated Eγ0
satisﬁes maximal freedom
with Eγ0 (j) ) Eγ (j) for some j ∈ N and (x,γ0) ∈ Λ(R).
Proof. If γ =( M,g) ∈ μ(Γ) is such that the associated Eγ does not satisfy
maximal freedom, there exists at least one j ∈ N with Eγ (j) + Ω({x}). Then,
deﬁne γ0 =( M0,g 0) ∈ μ(Γ)a sf o l l o w s :f o rs u c hj ∈ N, M0
j = Mj ∪ {x} and
M0






x if mj = x ∈ M0
j;
g (m)o t h e r w i s e .
Then, by construction, (x,γ0) ∈ Λ(R)a n dEγ0 (j) ) Eγ (j) holds. Note that
if Eγ0 (h) ⊇ Ω({x})f o ra l lh ∈ N,t h e nEγ0 satisﬁes maximal freedom. Oth-
erwise, follow the instruction for constructing the game form γ∗ =( M∗,g∗) ∈
μ(Γ) in the proof of Lemma 2.F o rt h i sγ∗, the associated Eγ∗ satisﬁes max-
imal freedom.
Lemma 4: Suppose the game form γ ∈ Γ has the α-eﬀectivity function Eγ
such that Eγ(i)={A} for some i ∈ N. Then, for every R ∈ Rn and every
(x,γ) ∈ Λ(R), there exists γ0 ∈ Γ such that Eγ0(i) 6= {A} and (x,γ0) ∈ Λ(R).
Moreover, if {x} = τ(R,γ),t h e n{x} = τ(R,γ0).
Proof. We construct a new game form γ0 =( M0,g0) ∈ Γ as follows: for each
h ∈ N\{i}, M0
h = Mh and M0






x if mi = x;
g (m)o t h e r w i s e .




mh ∪{x})f o re a c hh ∈ N\{i},a n d
Eγ0
(i)=Ω({x}).
Lemma 5: Let γ ∈ Γ be an i-dictatorial game form. Then, for every R ∈ Rn
and every (x,γ) ∈ Λ(R), there exists γ0 ∈ μ(Γ) such that Eγ0(j) 6= {A} for
some j ∈ N\{i} and (x,γ0) ∈ Λ(R).
Proof. By the similar method used in the proof of Lemma 4,w ec a nc o n -
struct a desired game form γ0.
Lemma 6: Given i ∈ N and Q ∈ Sn ⊆ Qn,l e t{j} ∈ Ni(Q). Then, for
every (γ,γ0) ∈ Γp(i) × Γu(i) with Eγ0(j)={A}, every R ∈ Rn, and every
(x,γ),(x0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R), (x,γ)P (Qj(R))(x0,γ0) holds.
Proof. Let a proﬁle R0 ∈ Rn be such that every individual is universally
indiﬀerent over A.T h e n , f o r e v e r y ( x,γ),(x0,γ0) ∈ A × Γ,( x,γ),(x0,γ0) ∈
Λ(R0). Moreover, if γ ∈ Γp(i)a n dγ0 ∈ Γu(i)w i t hEγ0(j)={A},t h e n
(x,γ)P (Qj(R0))(x0,γ0). This follows from (x,γ)P (Qj(R0))(x,γ0)a sw e l la s
(x,γ0)I (Qj(R0))(x0,γ0)b yt h ep r o p e r t yo fSn, coupled with the transitivity
of Qj(R0). Thus, by the condition (n-c), for every R ∈ Rn,i f( x,γ),(x0,γ0) ∈
Λ(R), then (x,γ)P (Qj(R))(x0,γ0).
Proof of Theorem 1:14 Let ∩Q∈∆ΨNi(Q) ⊇ 2N\{i}\{∅}. For every R ∈ Rn,
every Q ∈ ∆Ψ,a n de v e r y( x,γ),(x0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R), we deﬁne Ψ as follows:
(i) if γ,γ0 ∈ Γp (i), then ((x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈ P (Q(R)) ⇔ ((x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈
P (Qi(R)) or ((x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈ I (Qi(R))∩P (Q1(R)) or ... ((x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈
14Throughout this proof, we make use of the set-theoretic representation of a binary







∩P (Qk+1(R)) for any k ∈ {1,...,n− 1}\{i},
and ((x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈ I (Q(R)) ⇔ ((x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈ I (QN(R));
(ii) if γ ∈ Γp (i)a n dγ0 ∈ Γu (i), then ((x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈ P (Q(R)); and
(iii) if γ,γ0 ∈ Γu(i), then ((x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈ P (Q(R)) ⇔ ((x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈
P (Qj(R)) ∪ P (QN(R)), and ((x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈ I (Q(R)) ⇔ ((x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈
I (Qj(R))\P (QN(R)) for some {j} ∈∩ Q∈∆ΨNi(Q), where Q = Ψ(Q).
Note that (i), (ii) and (iii) are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaus-
tive. The above Q(R) is complete, and has a two-tier structure. It is also
an ordering. We must examine whether or not the part (ii) is consistent
with the four Arrovian conditions and the domain restrictions. For every
(x,γ),(x0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R), if γ ∈ Γp(i)a n dγ0 ∈ Γu (i), then by the condition
∩Q∈∆ΨNi(Q) ⊇ 2N\{i}\{∅} and Lemma 6, there exists at least one individ-
ual j ∈ N\{i} such that Eγ0(j)={A} and (x,γ)P (Qj(R))(x0,γ0). Thus, the
part (ii) is consistent with SP and PI.
By construction, we may verify that Ψ satisﬁes SP, PI, I,a n dND as
follows. First, by the part (ii) of Ψ, Ψ satisﬁes ND. Second, to show that Ψ
satisﬁes I, assume that ((x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈ Qh(R) ⇔ ((x,γ),(x0,γ0)) ∈ Q0
h(R)
for every h ∈ N. Note that the social preferences Q(R)a n dQ0(R)o v e r
{(x,γ),(x0,γ0)} are completely determined by applying one of the parts (i),
(ii), and (iii) of Ψ.M o r e o v e r , Q(R)o v e r{(x,γ),(x0,γ0)} is determined by
applying the part (i), for instance, if and only if Q0(R)o v e r{(x,γ),(x0,γ0)}
is determined by applying the part (i). The same argument applies to (ii)
and (iii). This implies that Ψ satisﬁes I. Finally, by construction, the part
(i) and (iii) are respectively consistent with SP and PI.T h u s ,Ψ satisﬁes
SP and PI.M o r e o v e r ,∪Q∈∆Ψ ∪R∈Rn C(Ψ(Q);R) ⊆ Γ
p (i) by the part (ii) of
34Ψ.N o t e t h a t Γp (i) contains a game form γ with Eγ(i)={A}.H o w e v e r ,
such a game form cannot be rationally chosen. This is because, for every
R ∈ Rn,i f( x,γ) ∈ Λ(R), then there exists another game form γ0 ∈ Γp (i)
with Eγ0(i) 6= {A} and (x,γ0) ∈ Λ(R), which is guaranteed by Lemma 4 and
Lemma 5. Thus, by the restriction (b) of Sn,( x,γ0)P (Qi(R))(x,γ), which
implies (x,γ0)P (Q(R))(x,γ).
In summary, we have:
γ ∈∪ Q∈∆Ψ ∪R∈Rn C(Ψ(Q);R) ⇒∀ j ∈ N, ∃B
j ∈ E
γ(j)s . t .B
j 6= A.
Thus, ∪Q∈∆Ψ ∪R∈Rn C(Ψ(Q);R) ⊆ ΓL.
Note that for every γ ∈∪ Q∈∆Ψ ∪R∈Rn C(Ψ(Q);R), the associated Eγ
satisﬁes maximal freedom, which can be veriﬁed as follows. First, to show
that ∪Q∈∆Ψ ∪R∈Rn C(Ψ(Q);R) ⊆ μ(Γ), take a game form γ ∈ Γp (i)\μ(Γ)
with (x,γ) ∈ Λ(R). Then, by Lemma 2, we can see that there exists another
game form γ0 ∈ μ(Γ)∩Γp (i)w i t h( x,γ0) ∈ Λ(R), and either Eγ0(i) ) Eγ(i)o r
[Eγ0(i)=Eγ(i), Eγ0(h)=Eγ(h)f o rh =1 ,...,k− 1, and Eγ0(k) ) Eγ(k)f o r
some k 6= i]. This is because, if Eγ(i) + Ω({x}), then γ0 can be constructed so
as to satisfy Eγ0(i) ⊇ Ω({x})a n d( x,γ0) ∈ Λ(R)b yt h ep r o o fo fLemma 2.I f
Eγ(i)=Ω({x}), then γ0 can be constructed so as to satisfy Eγ0
(h)=Ω({x})
for any h ∈ N,a n d( x,γ0) ∈ Λ(R). Let Eγ(i)=Ω({x}) ∪ Ω(B), where
B ⊆ A\{x} is non-empty. If |B| > 1, then we can appropriately choose
y ∈ B such that Eγ0(i)=Ω({x}) ∪ Ω({y})a n dEγ0(h)=Ω({x,y})f o ra n y
h 6= i,a n d( x,γ0) ∈ Λ(R). Then, Eγ0(i) ) Eγ(i)a n dγ0 ∈ μ(Γ) ∩ Γp (i).
If B = {y},t h e nγ / ∈ μ(Γ) implies that there exists at least one individual
k 6= i such that {x,y} / ∈ Eγ(k). By constructing γ0 as Eγ0(i)=Ω({x}) ∪
Ω({y})a n dEγ0
(h)=Ω({x,y}) for any h 6= i,( x,γ0) ∈ Λ(R)h o l d s ,a n d
[Eγ0(i)=Eγ(i), Eγ0(h)=Eγ(h)f o rh =1 ,...,k− 1, and Eγ0(k) ) Eγ(k)
35for some k 6= i]. Moreover, if Eγ(i)=Ω({x}) ∪ Ω(B) ∪ Ω(B0) such that
∅ 6= B0 ⊆ A\(B ∪ {x}), then by repeating the same argument as in the proof
of Lemma 2, we can construct a desired game form, γ0 ∈ μ(Γ)∩Γp (i). Thus,
by the restriction (b) of Sn and (i) of Ψ,( x,γ0)P (Q(R))(x,γ)h o l d s ,s i n c e
either (x,γ0)P (Qi(R))(x,γ)o r[ ( x,γ0)I (Qi(R))(x,γ), (x,γ0)I (Qh(R))(x,γ)
for h =1 ,...,k− 1, and (x,γ0)P (Qk(R))(x,γ)f o rs o m ek 6= i]. Second,
suppose that γ ∈ μ(Γ)∩Γp (i)w i t h( x,γ) ∈ Λ(R), but the associated Eγ does
not satisfy maximal freedom. Then, by Lemma 3,w ec a ns e et h a tt h e r ee x i s t s
another game form γ0 ∈ μ(Γ) ∩ Γp (i), whose associated Eγ satisﬁes maximal
freedom, such that (x,γ0) ∈ Λ(R)a n de i t h e rEγ0
(i) ) Eγ(i)o r[ Eγ0
(i)=Eγ(i),
Eγ0(h)=Eγ(h)f o rh =1 ,...,k− 1, and Eγ0(k) ) Eγ(k)f o rs o m ek 6= i].
Thus, by the restriction (b) of Sn and (i) of Ψ,( x,γ0)P (Q(R))(x,γ)h o l d s .
By Lemma 1, there exists a liberal game form in C(Ψ(Q);R) for any Q ∈ ∆Ψ
and any R ∈ Rn, which is Nash solvable and eﬃcient.
Finally, we show that C(Ψ(Q);R) ⊆ ΓNS∩ΓL∩ΓPE holds for every Q ∈ ∆Ψ
and every R ∈ Rn.S u p p o s et h a tγ∗,γ∗0 ∈ C(Ψ(Q);R) such that Eγ∗ = Eγ∗0
and γ∗ ∈ ΓNS ∩ ΓL ∩ ΓPE,b u tγ∗0 ∈ (ΓNS ∩ ΓL)\ΓPE.L e t x ∈ τ(γ∗0,R)








such that (mh)h∈N ∈ ²(γ∗0,R)a n dx = g∗0 ¡
(mh)h∈N
¢








h∈N Eγ∗ (h) such that (mh)h∈N ∈ ²(γ∗,R)
and x = g∗ ¡
(mh)h∈N
¢
.S i n c e x is Pareto ineﬃcient, there exists y ∈ A
that is Pareto eﬃcient and Pareto dominates x. By van Hees (1999, The-
orem 1), we may assume that the eﬃcient game form γ∗ has the property
that, for any h ∈ N and any Bh ∈ Eγ∗








= Bh. Thus, since Bh
mh ∪ {y} ∈ Eγ∗
(h)f o re v e r yh ∈ N,t h e r e









= y. Then, (mh)h∈N ∈ ²(γ∗,R), since y Pareto dominates
x which is a best outcome within g∗ (m−h,M∗
h) ⊆∩ j6=hBj
mj for every h ∈ N.
Thus, (y,γ∗) ∈ Λ(R). Note by (x,γ∗),(y,γ∗) ∈ Λ(R) and the restriction (a)
of Sn,( y,γ∗)P (QN(R))(x,γ∗) holds, which implies (y,γ∗)P (QN(R))(x,γ∗0)
by the restriction (b) of Sn and Eγ∗ = Eγ∗0. This implies γ∗0 / ∈ C(Ψ(Q);R), a
desired contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 2: Let ∩Q∈∆ΨNi(Q) ⊇ 2N\{i}\{∅} and ∩Q∈∆ΨMi(Q) ⊇
2N\{∅}.F o re v e r yR ∈ Rn,e v e r yQ ∈ ∆Ψ, and every (x,γ),(x0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R),
deﬁne Ψ as in the proof of Theorem 1. W eh a v eo n l yt oe x a m i n et h e
uniform rationalizability by means of Q = Ψ(Q). By Theorem 1,i tf o l -
lows from ∩Q∈∆ΨNi(Q) ⊇ 2N\{i}\{∅} that C(Q;R) ⊆ μ(Γ) ∩ ΓL holds
for every Q ∈ ∆Ψ and every R ∈ Rn.T a k e R0 ∈ Rn such that every
individual is universally indiﬀerent over A.T h u s , f o r e v e r y h ∈ N,e v e r y
R ∈ Rn and every (x,γ),(x0,γ0) ∈ Λ(R), if γ,γ0 ∈ μ(Γ) ∩ ΓL with Eγ 6= Eγ0,
then (x,γ)Qh(R)(x0,γ0) ⇔ (x,γ)Qh(R0)(x0,γ0), where use is made of {h} ∈
∩Q∈∆ΨMi(Q). Thus, in this case, (x,γ)Q(R)(x0,γ0) ⇔ (x,γ)Q(R0)(x0,γ0).
Note that, for every γ ∈ μ(Γ) ∩ ΓL, there exists γ∗ ∈ ΓNS ∩ ΓPE ∩ ΓL such
that Eγ∗ = Eγ. Then, as shown in the proof of Theorem 1, there exists
x∗ ∈ τ(γ∗,R)a n dx ∈ τ(γ,R) for every R ∈ Rn such that x∗ Pareto dom-
inates x at R and (x∗,γ∗)P (Q(R))(x,γ). Thus, if (x,γ)Q(R0)(x0,γ0)h o l d s
for any γ0 ∈ μ(Γ)∩ΓL with Eγ0 6= Eγ,t h e n( x∗,γ∗)Q(R)(x00,γ00)h o l d sf o ra n y
γ00 ∈ μ(Γ) ∩ ΓL and for any R ∈ Rn, whenever (x00,γ00) ∈ Λ(R). This implies
that γ∗ ∈∩ R∈RnC(Q;R).
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